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1 Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the political acceptance of discriminatory commodity taxes. By 
discriminatory commodity taxation we mean a tax regime in which the consumption of some 
good i is taxed at a different rate than that of some other good j. We focus on discriminatory 
commodity (rather than income) taxation not only because it is not uncommon (e.g. excise 
taxes), but also because a case for the economic desirability of discriminatory commodity 
taxes is easy to make. The reason is that such taxes can be efficient. In the experimental 
laboratory, we vary the distributional fairness of discriminatory taxes to test when such taxes 
are popular with voters, as explained below.  
To see that discriminatory taxes can be more efficient than uniform taxes, consider the 
simple case in which government wants to raise a particular revenue from commodity 
taxation, and suppose there are only two markets. Suppose that demand in one market is 
(own-price) elastic, i.e. demand falls strongly when the price of this good increases, while 
demand in the other market is inelastic (and suppose markets are independent, i.e. the cross-
price elasticity is zero). It is easy to see that if the goal of the government is to minimize 
efficiency losses, government should tax the inelastic market more heavily (the so-called 
inverse-elasticity rule is a special case of the Ramsey (1927) rule).
1
 This type of 
discriminatory taxation is thus efficient (in the sense that it minimizes the deadweight loss 
from taxation) but imposes a higher burden on consumers in the inelastic market.  
A common argument forwarded to explain why such discriminatory taxes are 
unpopular despite being efficient is that they often induce unfair distributional outcomes.
2
 To 
continue our example above, suppose that the poor spend most of their income on consuming 
the inelastic good (food, say), and the rich spend most of their income on the elastic good (a 
luxury good, say). The simple inverse-elasticity rule discussed above would now imply taxing 
necessities heavily and luxuries lightly. The tax would be regressive as it imposes a heavy 
burden on the poor and a light one on the rich. This outcome clearly flies in the face of 
distributional equity. 
                                                 
1
  The Ramsey rule essentially says that indirect taxes should be designed so as to cause an equi-proportionate 
reduction in the compensated demands for all commodities. Discriminatory taxes may not be optimal in more 
complicated settings e.g. when commodity consumption is complementary to labor supply (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz 1980), see e.g. Sørensen (2010) for a discussion. 
2
  An extreme example of discriminatory taxation that is claimed to improve efficiency is to tax body height, 
i.e. a tall person of a given income should pay more in taxes than a short person of the same income, see 
Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010). 
 3 
This paper investigates the political acceptance of discriminatory taxation in an 
experiment with consumers who participate in a democratic vote. Consumers obtain rents 
from purchasing units of a commodity in markets. They then vote on two tax regimes to raise 
a given tax revenue. The “discriminatory tax” (note that we use neutral labels in the 
experiment) is levied on the market with an inelastic demand only; the market with elastic 
demand remains tax exempt. The discriminatory tax (DT) is efficient but distributes the tax 
burden unequally between the subjects. In treatment LOW, it is the “poor” (participants who 
earn low incomes in the market) who bear the burden of the discriminatory tax. In this sense, 
DT is efficient but unfair. In contrast, the regime with a “uniform tax” (UT) is inefficient (it 
reduces total welfare more than the DT) but procedurally fair as it treats everyone in the same 
way (i.e. UT imposes the same formal tax rate on all participants) and distributionally fair as 
it yields the same ex-post incomes (i.e. UT eliminates inequality across markets and voters).  
We find, unsurprisingly perhaps, that DT is unpopular. To test whether DT is 
unpopular because of the unfair ex-post distribution of income DT tends to generate, we run a 
treatment in which it is the “rich” (participants who earn high incomes in the market) who 
bear the burden of DT (we call this treatment HIGH). We find that DT remains unpopular 
even when it is both efficient and distributionally fair, and that voters at least initially are 
strongly biased toward UT. The reason seems to be that the “procedural fairness” of UT 
(treating everyone the same way) is salient to voters and this fairness aspect dominates 
concerns for efficiency or distributional fairness in the context of commodity taxation as 
studied here. With repetition, the effect of concerns for fairness is greatly reduced and most 
voters eventually vote in line with material self-interest.  
Our paper contributes to a small experimental literature on voting to tax markets 
which can be thought of as a special case of the broader literature on endogenous policies and 
institutions. While experiments studying the properties of experimental markets are abundant 
(see Kagel 1995 for a survey) and experimental studies investigating voting and collective 
choice are common
3
, there are only very few papers available which study voting on market 
parameters, in particular taxation  (e.g. Cherry et al. 2012, Großer and Reuben 2013, 
Sausgruber and Tyran 2011). Note that this innovative combination of two institutions forces 
us to restrict ourselves to relatively simple market and voting institutions (see section 2). In a 
broader perspective, our paper also contributes to a literature on endogenous, i.e. 
                                                 
3
  Experimental studies on voting on other topics in political science have recently been so numerous that a 
new, especially dedicated journal, the Journal of Experimental Political Science, has been created to publish 
related research. A recent example of a voting study is e.g. Markussen et al. (2013). 
 4 
democratically chosen, policies and institutions. In particular, we contribute to the literature 
that investigates how non-standard preferences shape voting outcomes (e.g. Höchtl et al. 
2012, Feddersen et al. 2003) and market outcomes (e.g. Fehr and Falk 1999). Within this 
literature, considerable attention is devoted to studying the role of pro-social orientations 
(inequality-aversion, reciprocity etc.), only few papers have investigated the role of 
procedural fairness aspects such as non-discrimination, to the best of our knowledge (e.g. 
Bolton et al. 2005). 
 
2 Experimental Design 
Our design combines a market and a voting experiment. The subjects earn incomes by trading 
in a market and choose how to tax market transactions by majority vote. Section 2.1 explains 
the market institution as well as the procedures and rules for voting. Section 2.2 describes the 
sequence of events and the feedback subjects receive during the experiment. Section 2.3 
explains the experimental treatments and discusses our predictions.  
 
2.1 Market and Voting 
All subjects participate as consumers in markets in which they can buy units of a hypothetical 
good from automated sellers. At the start of the experiment, the subjects are randomly 
assigned to one of two markets and remain in the same market throughout the entire 
experiment. Both markets are organized as a uniform-price sealed bid/offer auction (see 
Appendix II for instructions). In every period, consumers bid for units of the commodity they 
wish to buy.  
Market outcomes are determined as follows: Bids are ordered from high to low, all 
bids exceeding the uniform offers are accepted, and the last accepted bid determines the price 
for all units traded. Thus, the market clears at a uniform price equal the lowest accepted bid. 
A buyer’s payoff per traded unit is the difference between the induced value and the market 
price; the payoff is zero, if he does not trade. In our experiment, taxes in both regimes are 
transaction taxes, i.e. the tax only depends on the number of transactions, not on their value. 
A tax adds to sellers’ cost. Since automated sellers bid their true (tax inclusive) cost, 
implementing a seller tax of t shifts the supply function up by t. At the end of a trading period, 
consumers learn the market price and their earnings for that period. A new trading period 
begins and every consumer starts to bid again. 
 5 
Using this market institution has three important advantages for our purposes. First, 
the market is known from previous experiments to quickly converge to equilibrium 
predictions.
4
 Second, trading in our market is simple and is easy to explain to participants, 
allowing participants to concentrate on the choice of the tax regime which is the main focus of 
our paper. Third, this market institution allows us to automate sellers which simplifies the 
analysis.
5
 
 
Figure 1: Market parameters in treatment LOW 
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Figure 1 shows the parameters in the two markets that operate independently and 
simultaneously. Each market has four consumers and there are no spillovers between markets 
whatsoever.  
Market 1 (left panel) has elastic demand. Each of the i = 1…4 consumers in this 
market has redemption values for three units of the commodity. The values are i1 = 130, i2 = 
                                                 
4
  The properties of uniform-price sealed-bid markets are well established in the literature; see Smith et al. 
(1982) or more recently Sausgruber and Tyran (2011). This literature finds rapid convergence to competitive 
equilibrium in uniform-price sealed-bid markets if the following holds: (i) privacy, i.e. each agent knows 
only his own valuation (or cost); (ii) exchange follows the rules described in the main text; (iii) stationary 
replication, i.e. aggregate market supply and demand is stable for a number of periods; and (iv) deep markets, 
i.e. there are at least four buyers and as many sellers. Consumers have no incentive to bid their true value in 
such markets. Yet, convergence to equilibrium is remarkably strong because the consumers have an incentive 
to bid the price down to marginal cost. In addition, when there is excess supply, human sellers would have an 
incentive to compete.  
5
  Automating sellers has a number of advantages. First, such sellers trade actively even when their equilibrium 
rent is zero. Second, their bidding behavior is perfectly predictable to buyers because they are commonly 
known to trade according to pre-determined rules (they ask their costs). We can thus avoid erratic bidding 
which might occur when participants are assigned the role of sellers. Third, we prevent potentially 
complicated and thus distracting comparisons of relative income between buyers and sellers.  
 6 
50, and i3 = 50 points. Consumers receive the same redemption values in every period of the 
entire experiment. A consumer earns the difference between these values and the market price 
per unit traded in the market. When there is no tax in this market, the supply curve (S0) is 
horizontal at 30 points, i.e., the cost per unit is c = 30. Demand (D) intersects supply (S0) at a 
price of p1(t0) = 30 points and a quantity of q1(t0) = 12 units. In equilibrium, where supply 
intersects demand, total consumer rent is Π1(t0) = 560 points and every individual consumer 
earns a rent of π1(t0) = 140 points. Consumer rents in points are converted into money at a rate 
of points 100 = €0.3 and paid out in cash to the subjects at the end of the experiment. 
Market 2 (right panel) has inelastic demand. Again, there are four consumers j = 1…4 
in the market. Each of them has only one redemption value at j = 130 points (in all periods). 
Pre-tax supply (S0) intersects demand at a price of p2(t0) = 30 points and a quantity of q2(t0) = 
4 units. In market 2, the total rent absent taxation is Π2(t0) = 400 and every consumer earns 
π2(t0) = 100 points, i.e. about 30% less than consumers in market 1. 
Participants start trading in untaxed markets for 5 periods. After period 5, the 
experimenter halts trading and informs subjects that a tax revenue of given size has to be 
raised in each period for the remainder of the experiment by taxing market transactions. 
Subjects are told that they have the choice between two tax regimes (see Appendix III for the 
voting proposal).
6
  
The “uniform tax” regime (UT) imposes the same tax tu = 40 to transactions in both 
markets.
7
 The tax increases the unit cost by 40 points and shifts the supply schedule from S0 
to Su in both markets (see dashed line Su in both panels of Figure 1). We chose the parameters 
such that the UT is distributionally fair, i.e. induces equal market incomes in both markets in 
equilibrium. In particular, after-tax equilibrium prices and quantities are the same in both 
markets: p1(tu) = p2(tu) = 70 and q1(tu) = q1(tu) = 4. The total tax revenue per period is T(tu) = 
320. Total consumer rents are therefore equal in both markets: Π1(tu) = Π2(tu) = 240 and all 
consumers receive the same rent in equilibrium i1(tu) = j2(tu) = 60. UT is thus a “fair” tax in 
the sense that it eliminates the inequality that prevailed without tax (pre-tax equilibrium rents 
per capita in the two markets are 140 and 100, respectively). However, UT is an inefficient 
tax in the sense that it reduces the sum of payoffs.
8
 In fact, the sum of the after-tax consumer 
                                                 
6
  In our experiment, tax receipts are wasted. For experiments that use tax receipts for providing public goods 
or redistribution see, for instance, Güth and Mackscheidt (1984) and Güth at al. (2005). 
7
  The instructions generally used neutral labels. For example, we call the taxes in the two regimes “alternative 
1” and “alternative 2” rather than “uniform” and “discriminatory” as in the main text.  
8
  This notion of efficiency is sometimes called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  
 7 
rents and the tax revenue (Π1(tu) + Π2(tu) + T(tu) = 800) is smaller than the sum of consumer 
rents before tax (Π1(t0) + Π2(t0) = 960). This deadweight-loss (DWL(tu) = 960 – 800 = 160) 
arises because buyers in the elastic market 1 are forced to reduce their consumption as they no 
longer can profitably trade their low-valuation units at the after-tax gross price. 
The “discriminatory tax” regime (DT) imposes a tax td2 = 80 on transactions in the 
inelastic market 2 and leaves transactions in the elastic market 1 untaxed (td1 = 0). The after-
tax supply (Sd) in market 2 shifts vertically to c + td = 110 (see solid line Sd in the right panel 
of Figure 1). The after-tax equilibrium price is p2(td) = 110 and consumer rents in this market 
shrink to Π2(td) = 80. Because market 1 remains untaxed (and because markets are 
independent), outcomes remain at the initial levels in market 1, i.e., p1(t0) = 30 and q1(t0) = 12. 
Total revenue from imposing the discriminatory tax on market 2 is T(td) = 320, which is 
exactly the same as under the uniform tax. DT differs from UT both with respect to equality 
of incomes and with respect to efficiency. While UT eliminates income inequality (compared 
to the untaxed state), DT exacerbates it (per capita equilibrium rents are 140 and 20 in market 
1 and 2, respectively). But DT is more efficient than UT. DT avoids distortions of market 
outcomes, i.e., the tax does not reduce total welfare: DWL(td) = 0 (because Π1(td1) + Π2(td) + 
T(td) = Π1(t0) + Π2(t0) = 960).  
Voting is organized such that the four consumers in market 1 and the four consumers 
in market 2 simultaneously vote between the two alternatives. Voting is compulsory (no 
abstentions) and costless. Simple majority decides. In case of a tie (4:4 votes) the uniform tax 
serves as the default, i.e., the discriminatory tax DT is imposed only if it wins a majority of 
votes (i.e., 5 or more).
9
 The instructions tell the subjects that the tax will add to the cost of the 
sellers. We explicitly inform the subjects that a seller will accept a bid only of it equals or 
exceeds the seller’s cost plus the tax which applies in the market. With this feature of the 
design, the subjects can easily anticipate that the tax adds to the pre-tax market price. 
 
2.2 Sequence and feedback 
Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of phases in our design. An experimental session has 10 main 
phases with taxation which follow the phase 0 without taxation. Each main phase consist of a 
vote and a subsequent trading in the market.  
                                                 
9
  We chose not to break ties randomly to obtain a sharper statistical comparison of acceptance rates across 
treatments by removing noise. 
 8 
In phase 0, the consumers learn the total number of transactions in their market and the 
market price after each trading period. They also receive information about their period 
earnings and the number of their individual transactions.  
 
Figure 2:  Sequence of decisions in the experiment 
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In the main phases (phase 1 and later), participants first vote on the two tax regimes. 
As feedback from voting, subjects learn the total number of votes for each alternative; they do 
not learn whether the votes for a particular alternative come from their own or the other 
market. The outcome of the vote is binding for trading in the next 5 market periods. This 
procedure is repeated 10 times, i.e. every subject votes 10 times.  
At the end of each period in the main phases, subjects learn the market price and the 
total quantity traded in their market. They receive information about the number of own 
trades and own profit. At the end of a main phase, subjects in addition learn how the regime 
affected other participants in their own market, in the other market, and in both markets as a 
whole. In particular, the subjects are reminded of the tax that applies in a given market and 
they are informed about the corresponding average per-capita earnings over the last 5 periods 
in their own market, in the other market. In addition, subjects learn the per-capita tax 
payments and earnings averaged over both markets over the last 5 periods. Provided that there 
is some variation in aggregate voting outcomes, subjects can use this information to compare 
the welfare cost of taxation. To make this information more salient and to facilitate 
comparisons across tax regimes, subjects are required to copy the information on the feedback 
screen on a separate form at the end of each phase. We note however, that buyers ex ante have 
incomplete information about the distribution of the tax burden between the markets. The 
information conditions in our experiment are common to market experiments and mimic the 
fact that participants possess only private information about market parameters. 
 9 
Consequently, buyers have to anticipate the effects of taxation with uncertainty, but they can 
learn to the extent that they gain informative experience.  
 
2.3 Treatments 
The design has two treatments. Treatment LOW implements the parameters as described in 
the previous section (see Figure 1). Treatment HIGH is the same as LOW but increases the 
redemption values of the four consumers in market 2 from j(LOW) = 130 to j(HIGH) = 250. 
Because this increase does not change equilibrium prices and quantities in either market, this 
increase simply implies that the consumers in market 2 have higher incomes in equilibrium in 
HIGH than in LOW (hence the treatment labels).  
The purpose of the treatment variation is to test whether the reason for the (expected) 
low popularity of efficient commodity taxes is to be found in the distributional inequality it 
typically involves. If so, we should see that the discriminatory tax DT is more popular in 
HIGH than in LOW. The reason is that DT is both efficient and “fair” (in the sense of 
burdening “rich” voters more and eliminating income inequality across all participants) in 
HIGH but is efficient and “unfair” (in the sense of increasing income inequality) in LOW. 
Table 1 shows the payoff consequences of the tax regimes in the two treatments. The 
numbers in the cells are the equilibrium rent in points per consumer and period. In section 3 
we show that the markets in our experiment quickly converge to the equilibrium predictions. 
The numbers in Table 1 therefore closely approximate the per-period earnings of subjects in 
our experiment.  
In treatment LOW, the uniform tax equalizes after-tax earnings at a level of 60 points, 
see column (2) of the table. In contrast, consumers earn 140 points in market 1 and 20 points 
in market 2 under the discriminatory tax, see column (3) of the table. Notice again that the 
uniform tax is inefficient: the sum of rents is smaller under UT than DT. 
In treatment HIGH, under the uniform tax consumers earn 60 points in market 1 and 
180 points in market 2 (see column 5). Now it is the discriminatory tax that equalizes the rents 
between the markets at 140 points (see column (6) of Table 1). Note that, except for the 
higher rents of consumers in market 2, treatments LOW and HIGH are identical. In particular, 
the welfare loss from uniform as compared to discriminatory taxation is held constant at 160 
points, or 50% of the tax revenue, across treatments.  
 10 
Table 1: Equilibrium consumer rents (in points, per period) by market, treatment, and 
tax regime (UT = Uniform Tax, DT = Discriminatory Tax)  
 LOW HIGH 
 
(1) 
No tax 
(2) 
UT 
(3) 
DT 
(4) 
No tax 
(5) 
UT 
(6) 
DT 
 t1 = t2 = 0 tu1 = tu2 = 40 td1 = 0, td2 = 80 t1 = t2 = 0 tu1 = tu2 = 40 td1 = 0, td2 = 80 
Market 1 
4 consumers 
(elastic demand) 
140 60 140 140 60 140 
Market 2 
4 consumers 
(inelastic demand) 
100 60 20 220 180 140 
∑ Consumer rents 960 480 640 1440 960 1120 
Tax revenue 0 320 320 0 320 320 
Deadweight Loss 
(DWL) 
0 160 0 0 160 0 
Total Rents 960 800 960 1440 1280 1440 
 
 
2.4 Discussion of the Design 
According to standard economics, the discriminatory tax is (narrowly) rejected in both 
treatments. Assuming that all voters are rational and self-interested and vote sincerely, the 
votes will be tied because material interests of the voters conflict across markets. Consumers 
in market 1 earn less under uniform taxation (UT) than with DT whereas the opposite is true 
for consumers in market 2 (see Table 1). All voters in market 1 are thus predicted to vote for 
DT, and none vote for DT (but all for UT) in market 2.
10
 A tie therefore occurs at 4:4 votes, 
and given our voting rule, the uniform tax UT will be implemented as the default. The 
information conditions of the experiment are sufficient to predict voting of rational and self-
interested subjects.
11
 The same predictions apply for both treatments.  
                                                 
10
  For self-interested subjects, it is weakly dominant to vote for the alternative that offers the highest income.  
However, voters may not be pivotal and equilibria exist in which voters do not vote for their preferred 
alternative. We therefore assume that each voter faces a positive probability of being decisive and votes to 
maximize expected payoff. This assumption is reasonable because in our experiment the electorate is small 
and the probability of being pivotal is high.   
11
  To obtain this prediction, we need to assume that buyers expect with positive probability market prices to 
increase in response to higher taxes. This assumption is very likely met in our experiment for a number of 
 11 
The predictions discussed above are derived using the assumption of rational and self-
interested agents who do not harbor concerns for fairness or efficiency in and of itself. But it 
is easy to think of non-standard, social preferences that may tip these predictions toward an 
efficient outcome (for a recent survey of experimental results regarding social preferences, see 
Cooper and Kagel 2013). Below, we discuss aversion to inequality, a taste for efficiency, and 
a preference for “fair treatment” (avoiding active discrimination) as additional motivations 
that may influence the popularity of the tax regimes. 
First, support for discriminatory taxation can be rationalized by assuming a concern 
for equal distribution. To illustrate, suppose that subjects are averse to inequality in the 
distribution of after-tax market incomes (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000). In LOW, equilibrium payoffs in the two markets are the same under UT and different 
under DT. In HIGH, the opposite is true. Therefore, if subjects have a plain taste for equality, 
one may expect higher support for the discriminatory tax in HIGH than LOW. The prediction 
based on inequality aversion is subtle, though. To see this, note that consumers in market 1 
who care for equality would have to give up 80 points for themselves to avoid a loss of 40 
points for consumers in market 2. Such highly costly choices are empirically implausible and 
it is unlikely that the consumers in market 1 support the uniform tax because of inequality 
aversion (see e.g. Blanco et al. 2011).
12
 Inequality-aversion motives are more plausible to 
make a difference for voting of consumers in market 2. For them, the material self-interest 
overlaps with a preference for equality in LOW, whereas the two motives pull in opposite 
directions in HIGH. Hence, inequality aversion on behalf of voters in market 2 implies that 
the discriminatory tax receives more support in HIGH than in LOW. This argument may 
matter for aggregate voting outcome because the standard model predicts a close defeat of the 
discriminatory tax. Under these conditions, a few fairness-minded voters from market 2 
suffice to tip the balance (see Tyran and Sausgruber 2005 and Höchtl et al. 2012).  
Second, a taste for efficiency in the sense of maximizing total market rents is an 
obvious candidate to rationalize support for DT. For example, a pivotal voter in market 2 who 
                                                                                                                                                        
reasons. In particular, buyers learn from experience with trading in phase 0 that bids are rejected if they fall 
below the sellers’ unit cost, and buyers are told that the tax adds to this cost. Because the unit cost is 
constant, buyers typically experience a loss in earnings in response to a reduction of quantity traded in the 
market. Furthermore, the proposed taxes are large; they are particularly large enough to outsize even 
unusually large deviations from competitive equilibrium predictions.  
12
  In Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the parameter βi captures aversion to “favorable inequality” (i.e. to being ahead). 
The parameter reflects the weight a subjects puts on the difference between own and another subject’s 
payoff. To rationalize a choice as that for voters in market 1 in favor of the uniform tax, βi would need to 
large (see Tyran and Sausgruber 2005). Blanco et al. (2011) find that such extreme inequality aversion is 
exceedingly rare. 
 12 
supports the discriminatory tax loses 40 points, but another voter in market 1 gains more (80 
points) which means that total market rents go up. In our design, a taste for efficiency would 
therefore bias choices in favor of the discriminatory tax.
13
 Such a taste can be modeled in 
various ways. For example, Charness and Rabin (2002) assume that a subject’s utility does 
not only depend on its own payoff, but also on the minimum of payoffs in a reference group, 
as well as on the sum of payoffs in this group. A concern for efficiency has received some 
empirical support in experimental studies, e.g. by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) in simple 
distributional games and by Kerschbamer et al. (2013) in markets for credence goods.
14
  
Finally, there is a growing number of studies in economics suggesting that people not 
only care about outcomes of their interactions but also about the fairness of procedures (see, 
e.g., Babcock et al. 1995, Bolton et al. 2005, Chlaß et al. 2009, Krawczyk 2011, and Güth et 
al. 2013).
15
 In our design, subjects are randomly assigned to markets and to different 
redemption values which implies random differences in equilibrium rents. One might 
therefore consider the pre-tax allocation as procedurally fair because everyone has the same 
chance to be member of market 1 or 2. Moreover, many voters may find it difficult to judge 
the fairness of outcomes in early votes, when information is still incomplete. In this case, 
voting for the discriminatory tax would discriminate against the consumers in market 2 and a 
taste for procedural fairness could bias voting in favor of the uniform tax.
16
  
 
 
3 Results 
In total, 192 undergraduate student subjects from the University of Innsbruck participated in 
our experiment, and about two thirds of them had some basic background in economics. We 
ran 12 pairs of markets in treatment LOW and 12 pairs in treatment HIGH. Each pair 
consisted of 8 subjects who were randomly assigned to market 1 or market 2. The experiment 
was split into 12 sessions with 16 subjects each. A typical session lasted for about 90 minutes. 
                                                 
13
  Note that the bias would exist irrespective of the treatments because the treatments do not change the 
marginal incentives to choose one alternative over the other.  
14
  Note that in our setup, maximin-preferences (according to which people also care about the poorest member 
in society) would result in the same deviation from opportunistic behavior as inequality aversion because all 
consumers within a market earn the same income.  
15
  Considerable research on procedural justice and legitimacy is available in law and social psychology. See, for 
example, Tyler and Lind (2000). In the context of taxation, Wenzel (2002) finds that perceptions of 
procedural fairness also matter for tax compliance.  
16
  Again, marginal incentives do not vary the treatments and a concern for procedural fairness can therefore not 
explain differential voting across treatments. 
 13 
On average, a subject earned € 20, including a show-up fee of € 4. The experiment was 
programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  
We present our results as follows. Section 3.1 essentially shows that markets 
converged very well to equilibrium predictions and that welfare consequences of the tax 
regimes are as theoretically expected. Section 3.2 essentially shows that the uniform tax (UT) 
was more popular than predicted but that voting converged to the standard theory prediction 
with repetition. Section 3.3 discusses learning from experience and section 3.4 provides a 
broad discussion of results.  
 
3.1 Market Outcomes 
Figure 3 shows transaction prices over time, averaged over all 24 markets of each type. When 
markets 1 remain untaxed (in phase 0 or because DT is accepted in the main phases) the 
predicted price is p1(t0) = 30 (see Figure 1). In markets with a uniform tax, the predicted 
prices are p1(tu) = p2(tu) = 70 for both markets 1 and 2. Finally, in markets 2 with the 
discriminatory tax implemented the price prediction is p2(td) = 110. The figure reveals that 
realized transaction prices quickly converge (by design from above) to these predictions. 
Quantity traded also quickly converges to equilibrium. For example, in the final period of 
phase 0 buyers exploit between 93% and 95% of all opportunities to trade at a surplus in 
market 1 and market 2, respectively. 
When realized prices and quantities are close to equilibrium, so are rents. In treatment 
LOW, the average earnings across all periods and subjects in market 1 are 129.2 points with 
the DT and 53.4 points with UT. The respective numbers for market 2 are 56.1 and 16.5 
points. In HIGH, the average earnings in market 1 are 130.5 and 54.7 points with DT and UT, 
respectively. In market 2 the respective numbers are 171.1 and 131.1 points. These numbers 
are sufficiently close to the equilibrium predictions (see Table 1) such that our discussion of 
predictions for voting which was based on equilibrium considerations need not be 
reconsidered given the realized values. In particular, a materially self-interested voter would 
always prefer the discriminatory tax in market 1 and reject it in market 2, and this is true in 
both treatments.  
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Figure 3: Transaction prices (averaged over 24 markets per type)  
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3.2 Voting Outcomes 
Table 2 shows the share of individual votes for the two tax regimes by market in the first two 
columns of each panel. The third column shows aggregate acceptance rates, i.e. the share of 
referenda that lead to acceptance of the discriminatory tax (DT), averaged over all phases. 
Overall, two facts stand out. First, as predicted by standard assumptions, DT generally 
receives strong support from voters in market 1 and weak support from voters in market 2. 
Conversely, the uniform tax (UT) is more popular in market 2 than 1. Second, many votes are 
inconsistent with self-interested voting. This is particularly the case in market 1. For example, 
31% of voters in market 1 in treatment LOW vote against their material self-interest by 
supporting UT (which yields an equilibrium payoff of 60 rather than 140 as with DT). 
Our hypothesis is that making the efficient DT also distributionally fair and imposing 
the burden on the “rich” (in treatment HIGH) increases the popularity of DT. On average, 
support for this hypothesis is weak, however. The average share of individual votes in favor 
of DT (across both markets), is 45.1% (= 433/960) in LOW and 46.7% (= 448/960) in HIGH. 
These shares are not significantly different from each other (p = 0.434).
17
 The discriminatory 
tax is rarely accepted by a majority. In fact, DT is approved by a majority in 13% (= 15/120) 
of all votes in LOW and in 20% (= 24/120) in HIGH. The effect on the aggregate is only 
                                                 
17
  Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) test using 12 independent observations per treatment (voting decision per market 
averaged over all periods). 
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weakly significant and only if based on a one-sided test (p = 0.058).
18
 Moreover, the higher 
support for DT in HIGH (vs. LOW) is driven exclusively by voting in market 1. In this 
market, the average approval rate increases from 69% to 84% between LOW and HIGH (p = 
0.014 WRS). In stark contrast, voters in market 2 vote less frequently for the discriminatory 
tax in HIGH than LOW (9% vs. 21%, p = 0.021, WRS).  
 
Table 2: Approval rates (numbers in parentheses show equilibrium market rents) 
 LOW HIGH 
 Individual votes Aggregate 
support  
Individual votes Aggregate 
support  
 Uniform 
UT 
Discrim. 
DT 
Discrim. 
DT 
Uniform 
UT 
Discrim. 
DT 
Discrim. 
DT 
Market 1 
4 consumers 
(elastic demand) 
31% 
(60) 
69% 
(140) 
13% 
16% 
(60) 
84% 
(140) 
20%  
Market 2 
4 consumers 
(inelastic demand) 
79% 
(60) 
21% 
(20) 
91% 
(180) 
9% 
(140) 
 
In our discussion in section 2.4 we have argued that inequality aversion is unlikely to 
matter for voting in market 1, as for them in LOW voting for the uniform tax (i.e., voting in 
line with inequality aversion) is very costly in own monetary terms. The question is then why 
the uniform tax nonetheless is popular for many voters in market 1.   
Table 2 provides a first answer to this question. If we consider the votes which deviate 
from standard predictions in LOW, we see that voting is biased toward uniform taxation 
(compare 31% and 21% between the cells Market 1 & UT and Market 2 & DT). The same 
pattern applies in HIGH (compare 16% and 9% in the cells Market 1 & UT and Market 2 & 
DT, respectively). This result is surprising: it holds although UT is more costly in own 
monetary terms for voters in market 1 than is DT for voters in market 2; in addition, it holds 
irrespective of which tax regime leads to equal after-tax incomes. This observation implies 
that the uniform tax is appealing to many subjects irrespective of its effects on the level and 
                                                 
18
  One-sided two-sample test of proportions. 
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distribution of after-tax incomes. Procedural fairness perceptions are a likely candidate to 
explain this pattern. 
Figure 4 shows that there is a pronounced bias toward the uniform tax (UT) early in 
the experiment, but that this bias is almost eliminated by the end of the experiment. In our 
experiment, subjects voted 10 times on the same tax proposal. Figure 4 shows the individual 
and aggregate approval rates per phase, market and treatment (Appendix I shows the raw data 
of this figure). Recall that based on material self-interest, 100% of votes in market 1 and 0% 
in market 2 should be in favor of DT. The most striking observation from Figure 4 is the large 
discrepancy of this prediction for voters in market 1 in the early phases of the experiment.  
In market 1 in LOW, only 38% of voters (= 18/48) approve of DT in the first vote. The 
support increases with repetition and the choices clearly converge toward the standard 
prediction. Despite this trend in LOW, 19% (= 9/48) of subjects vote against DT even in the 
last phase of the experiment. In HIGH, acceptance of DT in market 1 starts out higher in 
phase 1 at 52% (= 25/48) compared to LOW. From there it converges closer to the predicted 
value than in LOW, to 96% (= 46/48) in the last phase.  
 
Figure 4: Support for the discriminatory tax (DT) 
0
25
50
75
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
vo
te
s
AchsentitelMarket 1 Mark t 2 Aggregate
LOW HIGH
Phase
 
 
In market 2, voting behavior that is inconsistent with standard predictions could be 
explained by a concern for efficiency as well as errors. Note that inequality aversion is 
 17 
unlikely to drive non-egoistic voting on behalf of voters in market 2, as then approval rates 
would be higher in HIGH than in LOW.
19
 Generally, voting is closer to the benchmark 
prediction in market 2 than in market 1.
20
 Again, this observation indicates that voting is 
biased toward the uniform tax.
21
   
Why does the bias toward the uniform tax decrease with repetition? One possible 
explanation is that subjects initially care more about the norm of treating everyone alike 
because, absent explicit information about market outcomes, the procedural fairness norm is 
more salient. As the experiment proceeds, subjects receive feedback that emphasizes the 
consequence of the tax on market outcomes, in particular, the level and distribution of 
incomes across the two markets. We believe that as this information becomes more salient, 
the behavioral relevance of procedural fairness norm erodes.
22
 
 
3.3 Effects of Informative Experience 
Our results show that voting is biased toward treating everyone in the same way, i.e. taxing 
uniformly, perhaps because voters think about taxing everyone equally as an aspect of 
procedural fairness. We have arrived at this conclusion because we find that voters deviate by 
more from the benchmark prediction in market 1 than in market 2 irrespective of the level and 
distribution of market rents across treatments. This bias towards uniform taxation is more 
pronounced in early phases than after subjects have gained some experience. In what follows, 
we therefore discuss how feedback and learning from experience may have shaped our 
                                                 
19
  We can think of two explanations for why voters in market 2 exhibit a lower acceptance of the discriminatory 
tax in HIGH than in LOW. First, there is some evidence that people who are rich relative to others contribute 
less to public goods (Buckley and Croson 2006) or donate less to charities (List 2011). These observations 
suggest that altruism may not be independent of status concerns. Second, the subjects in our experiment 
receive feedback about voting outcomes after each phase. Part of the dynamic we observe may therefore be 
driven by reciprocity. This explanation appears less plausible, though, because market-2 voters are less likely 
to vote for the discriminatory tax in HIGH than in LOW already in the very first phase of the experiment.  
20
  The difference is significant (p = 0.041, according to a WRS-test using all 24 independent observations from 
both treatments i.e., using voting decisions per market averaged over all periods). 
21
  Fehr et al. (2006) provide evidence that efficiency motives are in part driven by a subject pool effect 
according to which students in business and economics have a particularly strong taste for efficiency. In the 
light of their finding, the low and decreasing support of DT by voters in market 2 is all the more surprising. 
Our subject pool consists of two thirds students with basic training in economics, and one would therefore 
expect the taste for efficiency to be particularly pronounced in our experiment. 
22
  Roth and Malouf (1979) find evidence suggestive of this interpretation. In their experiment, players 
bargained over lottery tickets that determined the probability with which each player wins a monetary 
reward. In the first condition the players only knew their own reward; in a second condition they had full 
information about their own and the opponent’s reward. Hence, the first condition highlighted procedural 
justice while the second condition put additional emphasis on allocation fairness. The result was that almost 
all players agreed on an equal division of lottery tickets in the first condition while the outcomes in the 
second condition shifted substantially toward an equal division of expected rewards.  
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results. However, experience is the result of (voting) choices, and because groups select into 
tax regimes, experience is endogenous and its effects cannot be interpreted as causal.  
A first fact to note is that experience accumulates slowly and asymmetrically across 
groups. In phase one, less than 10 percent (2/24 markets) experience DT. By the middle of the 
experiment, half of the markets have seen both DT and UT, and the other half has only seen 
UT. In the final phase, three quarters (18/24) of the markets have experienced both UT and 
DT, but one quarter has never accepted DT. The subjects who have experienced both tax 
regimes can readily compare the distribution and welfare consequences of the two tax regimes 
and their choices can be taken as an informed expression of their truly preferred option. Yet, 
these subjects may systematically differ in relevant characteristics, such as tastes or cognitive 
skills, from those who have never experienced DT which means that simple comparisons will 
not reveal a truly causal effect.   
Figure 5 presents the voting data over time broken down by experience. The time line 
shows renormalized phases such that zero is the time at which a group implemented DT for 
the first time. The grey bars show the number of markets observed at a particular phase and 
time distance from that event. Left of zero we see the data from all markets and phases prior 
to experiencing DT. By construction, the markets shown in the left half of the diagrams only 
experienced the results of UT. The right half of the diagrams (i.e. the positive domain) shows 
the data from all markets and phases that had experienced DT previously.
23
  
Figure 5 conveys two main messages. First, absent explicit information about the 
effects of DT vs. UT, voting is biased toward UT. This is particularly clear in LOW for voters 
in Market 1 (the black line in the left part of the upper diagram is far below 100%). The effect 
is somewhat weaker in HIGH, and there is also some deviation from self-interested voting in 
Market 2 (the dotted line in the upper diagram is above 0%). However, the net bias is clearly 
toward UT as can be seen by netting the vertical distance between the black line labeled 
“Market 1” and 100% and that between the dotted line labeled “Market 2” and 0%. Second, 
figure 5 suggests a strong and immediate effect of feedback on voting. Left of zero, when 
voters are inexperienced, between 37.5% and 75% of voters in market 1 vote for DT and there 
                                                 
23
 Here is an illustration of how to read the figure: At -4 on the horizontal axis, for example, we see the voting 
behavior (measured on the left scale labeled “Approval of DT in %”) of all inexperienced markets four 
phases before they implemented DT for the first time. At -4, the height of grey bars (measured on the right 
scale labeled “Number of markets” ) is 9 in LOW and 5 in HIGH. This means that there were 9 markets in 
LOW and 5 markets in HIGH who were inexperienced in phase t, but implemented DT in phase t+4. By 
construction, the behavior of the remaining groups who have implemented DT at least once after four phases 
(3 groups in LOW and 7 in HIGH) is indicated at value 6 (i.e., 10-4) on the horizontal axis. 
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is no clear trend. In sharp contrast, voting quickly converges to the money-maximizing choice 
when voters are experienced with both regimes, to the right of zero.  
 
Figure 5: Experience and support for the discriminatory tax (DT)  
(phases renormalized, 0 = first phase of implementing DT) 
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Treatment effects are weak if not entirely absent. In market 1, approval of 
inexperienced voters is slightly lower in LOW than HIGH (by 7.3 percentage points on 
average, p = 0.061); there is no treatment effect for experienced subjects though (2.4 points, p 
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= 0.250, according to a regression-based t-test).
24
 In market 2, outcomes do not differ between 
treatments, neither for inexperienced (average percentage point difference is -14.5, p = 0.433) 
nor experienced ones (-13.5, p = 0.160).
25
 Finally, aggregate approval in markets with 
experience does not differ across treatments (averaged across phases past experience: 18.3% 
vs. 19.5%, p=0.462 WSR). 
Our analysis of experience effects confirms our previous conjecture that subjects 
initially care more about the norm of treating everyone alike. As indicated by Figure 5, few 
markets accept DT already at early phases of the experiment (see the grey bars at the tails of 
the time line), and a sizeable number of markets remains without experience even for an 
extended period of time. As voting moves closely in line with predictions only once subjects 
have experienced the effect of DT, this result implies that voters who reject DT because they 
find it procedurally unfair have less opportunity to learn. This finding provides a first 
systematic reason for why a discriminatory tax may be generally unpopular. 
Interestingly, neither procedural fairness nor any norm of outcome-based fairness 
seems to play a role once the subjects have received salient feedback on the consequences of 
the tax regimes. We observe that experienced subjects vote in line with self-interest in both 
treatments LOW and HIGH. As a consequence, the efficient tax gets rejected even when it is 
distributionally fair. One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that the cost of 
obeying a particular fairness norm is highly asymmetric between the markets, and voters are 
likely to learn that this is so. Experience, for example, has taught voters in market 1 that 
voting for uniform taxation hurts, as it imposes substantial costs on themselves. The disutility 
from bearing this cost is likely to swamp concerns for procedural fairness and equality. In 
contrast, voting for UT, i.e. voting in accordance with procedural fairness, is costless for 
subjects in market 2. For them, norms of fair treatment may unfold to an extent that overrides 
other norms based on fair outcomes. In any case, in our design only few voters with non-
standard preferences in the guise inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency would suffice 
to tip the vote against DT. If this does not happen in our experiment, it is difficult to believe 
                                                 
24
  We use a linear probability model (with robust standard errors clustered in pairs of markets) and control for a 
time trend, a proxy for pivotality, a voter’s past voting behavior and past profit (see Table 3 and the 
explanations given there for the variables). To test for potential treatment effects on experienced vs. 
inexperienced subjects, we include a treatment dummy and condition on whether subjects had DT 
implemented or not. 
25
  In HIGH, voters in market 1 observe that they earn less than voters in market 2. Hence, inequality aversion 
may explain why voters are more likely to vote for DT in HIGH than in LOW even absent any experience 
with DT. As discussed in section 3.2, the results of voters in market 2 are difficult to reconcile with 
inequality aversion. 
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that these types of preferences would increase the popular support of discriminatory taxes in 
situations where fair voters are much less likely to be decisive. This finding provides a second 
systematic reason for why a discriminatory tax may be generally unpopular. 
 
3.4 Further Discussion of Results 
We now explain that expressive voting may account for why some vote against their material 
self-interest (i.e. non-sincerely) and that expressive voting has an asymmetric effect across 
markets. This is so because of an asymmetry between voters in market 1 (voters1) and 2. In 
particular, because of the default rule we use, voters in market 2 are more likely to be pivotal 
than those in market 1.  
To illustrate, suppose that voters in market 2 always stick to the standard prediction 
(they earn more with UT than DT). In this case, the DT is never implemented regardless of 
the choices by voters in market 1, i.e. voters in market 1 are never pivotal in this case. 
Conversely, suppose that the voters in market 1 always vote sincerely for DT (they earn more 
with DT because they remain untaxed). In this case, every voter in market 2 can tip the 
balance and induce acceptance of the discriminatory tax, i.e. voters in market 2 are likely to 
be pivotal. Voting against one’s materially preferred choice is therefore more costly in 
expectation in market 2 than in market 1 (assuming that utility is linear in earnings, this holds 
as long as the pivot probabilities are at least twice as large in market 2 as in market 1).  
The key idea of expressive voting theories is that there is a trade-off between 
expressing support (i.e. voting) for some “good cause” and the private (expected) cost of 
implementing the good cause. For example, the act of supporting environmentally friendly 
energy production may give voters some utility but if the policy is then implemented and 
energy is indeed produced in environmentally friendly ways, its cost (in the guise of higher 
electricity prices, say) may easily outweigh its benefits to this voter. But the cost of 
expressing support for the morally worthy cause depends on how likely it is that a particular 
voter affects the outcome, i.e. whether he is pivotal (see Brennan and Lomasky 1993). Voters 
would then be more likely to vote “morally” when they are unlikely to be decisive for the 
outcome, and the existence of sufficiently many of these voters may induce a “moralistic 
bias” (see Tyran 2004 and Feddersen et al. 2009 for experimental tests).  
In the context of our experiment, both voting for DT (because of a concern for 
efficiency) in market 2 and voting for UT in market 1 (because of a concern for procedural 
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fairness) could be thought of as a “moral” obligation. Note that the cost of acting “morally” in 
market 1 are twice as large as those in market 2 (40 vs. 80 points) but that because of high 
pivotality in market 2, the expected costs of voting morally are higher in market 2. Therefore, 
the theory of expressive voting predicts more insincere voting in market 1.  
 
Table 3: Probit model (marginal effects): Dependent variable shows 1 for vote in favor 
of the discriminatory tax, and 0 else.  
 Market 1 Market 2 
Pivot p-1 -0.049 -0.071** 
 (0.050) (0.036) 
HIGH 0.059** -0.259** 
 (0.027) (0.110) 
Vote p-1 0.415*** 0.542*** 
 (0.062) (0.068) 
Profit p-1 -0.001 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Phase 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Experience 0.155*** -0.047 
 (0.033) (0.039) 
Observations 864 864 
Pseudo R-squared 0.36 0.32 
Wald 378.83 122.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering in pairs of 
markets) in parentheses.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 3 shows the determinants of the likelihood of voting for DT (more precisely, the 
marginal effects of a Probit regression) to confront this argument with the data. The variable 
Pivotp-1 indicates whether a particular voter has been pivotal in the vote of the previous phase. 
We use this variable as a proxy for whether the voter expects to be decisive in the current 
phase. Specifically, the variable is set to 1 if there have been either 5 pro-votes including the 
own vote or 4 votes excluding the own vote in the previous phase, and set to 0 else. Hence, 
the variable indicates whether a voter would have changed the outcome, had he voted 
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differently.
26
 Counting the outcome of this variable per treatment reveals that the number of 
pivotal events is much lower in market 1 than 2 (19.5% = 187/960 cases in market 1 vs. 
47.7% = 458/960 in market 2). Because voters in market 1 are less likely to be pivotal they 
have lower expected costs of voting sincerely. The difference is moderate, though, because 
the cost in terms of payoff foregone of tipping the outcome against one’s material self-interest 
is twice as high in market 1 than 2, i.e. 80 vs. 40. Therefore, the expected cost is approx. 
47.7% * 40 = 19.1 in market 2 which is about 22% larger than the expected cost in market 1 
(19.5% * 80 = 15.6).   
We find for market 2 that voters who are pivotal are significantly less likely (by 7.1%) 
than voters who are not pivotal to vote against their material self-interest (i.e. voters are less 
likely to vote for taxing themselves when it is likely to hurt). This is not the case in market 1. 
There we find no difference in voting across pivotal vs. non-pivotal voters.
27
 Despite variable 
Pivotp-1 being insignificant for market 1 and negative significant for market 2, the estimated 
parameters of variable Pivotp-1 do not differ across markets (p = 0.543). It is therefore not 
likely that the difference in insincere voting across the markets explains our results. 
Regarding the remaining variables, HIGH is a dummy variable taking the value 1 
when the treatment is HIGH. Consistent with the earlier reported results, the first coefficient 
in the regression for Market 1 shows that voters are 5.9% more likely to vote for the 
discriminatory tax in HIGH than in LOW. This finding is consistent with the upward shift of 
the share of voters for DT in market 1 in Figure 4 (compare top line in HIGH vs. LOW) and 
suggests that a motive of fair distribution may have played some role in voting. Conversely, 
voters in Market 2 are about 25.9% less likely to vote for DT in HIGH than in LOW (see 
downward shift of the share voting for DT in Figure 4 when comparing LOW and HIGH). 
This effect is not consistent with a concern for fair distribution (voting for DT in HIGH 
produces an equal outcome).
28
 
Finally, Votep-1 is the decision in the previous phase, Profitp-1 is the subject’s profit in 
the previous phase; we include these variables as controls. Phase captures a trend over 
repeated voting, and Experience indicates whether the market had implemented the 
                                                 
26
  Remember that subjects were informed of the total number of votes for each alternative. 
27
  This is not equivalent to say that there is no support of expressive voting. If we split variable Pivotp-1 into the 
two possible pivotal events (3:5* or 4*:4 previous votes for UT: DT, respectively, where a * indicates the 
tally that includes the vote of the consumer considered) we find a close to significant effect of pivot4*:4 for 
voters in market 1 (-0.083, p = 0.103) and a significant effect of pivot3:5* for voters in market 2 (-0.102, p = 
0.006). Hence, voters from both market 1 and 2 seem to react to whether their vote has been pivotal or not. 
28
  See Footnote 19 for possible explanations of this effect.  
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discriminatory tax in one of the previous phases. These variables shed light on the dynamics 
of voting. As can be seen, voting is fairly persistent in both markets, but experience (and 
therefore feedback on the incidence of DT) matters for voters in market 1. In line with our 
discussion in section 3.3, these results suggest that in market 1 the support of DT increases 
with repetition mainly because of experience effects.  
 
 
4 Conclusion 
Discriminatory taxes are sometimes desirable from an efficiency perspective but frequently 
unpopular with voters. We have hypothesized that the acceptance of a discriminatory 
commodity tax depends on voters’ fairness perceptions. To test this intuition we have 
proposed an experiment involving voting on taxing market transactions. In one treatment the 
discriminatory tax (DT) results in an unfair distribution of incomes, in the other it contributes 
to establish fair market outcomes.  
Our results show that in early phases of the experiment, voting is biased toward taxing 
all voters alike (UT). For example, among voters who have a material interest in voting for 
DT (because they remain untaxed), more than 50% vote for UT in the first vote. The details of 
our results suggest that this pattern is driven by voters’ concerns for procedural fairness. 
Many voters seem to dislike the idea of imposing a discriminatory tax on a subgroup of 
voters. We do, however, find that this tax appears to be more acceptable to (untaxed) voters 
when it hits consumers who are relatively rich. Moreover, we find that the procedural fairness 
norm erodes when voters are more experienced and receive salient feedback about the 
consequences of taxation on the distribution of market incomes. Our study therefore 
establishes the relevance of multiple fairness norms in voting on commodity taxation. 
We think our results are rather surprising and our study invites further investigations 
into the topic. In fact, the choice of our design was motivated by the hypothesis (which seems 
to capture a popular view among policy-oriented economists) that efficient discriminatory 
taxes are unpopular because they tend to be distributionally unfair, and that such taxes would 
meet with more support if they were distributionally fair and imposed the burden on the 
“rich” (in treatment HIGH). Yet, the results did not support the hypothesis. In retrospect, we 
think the reason why the results of our study were hard to anticipate is that there are various 
social concerns in additional to distributional fairness that might potentially matter and cause 
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a bias away from the standard prediction, and some of these biases may operate in opposite 
ways. In particular, we study a setting in which standard theory predicts an inefficient 
outcome, and in which some types of social preferences have the potential to improve 
efficiency (e.g. inequality aversion, expressive voting or a concern for efficiency) while others 
(in particular a concern for procedural fairness) tends to favor the inefficient uniform tax. 
Given that our results suggest that referendum choices of inexperienced voters are importantly 
driven by a concern for procedural fairness, a useful next step would be to see how strong 
these concerns are in a setting in which standard theory predicts an efficient outcome and 
procedural fairness biases voting away from that outcome. 
If our conclusion that procedural fairness matters in voting on such tax regimes were 
to prove robust under such alternative designs, our study has potentially important policy 
implications. Our results seem to suggest that the distribution of the tax burden is of second-
order importance in the fairness perceptions of voters. Rather, commodity taxes are politically 
accepted if they formally tax everyone alike. The reason, we think, is to be found in the 
salience of the respective dimensions of what is fair. The distribution of market rents resulting 
from commodity taxation is typically hard to observe in the field (unlike the distribution of 
incomes from labor say). General value added and sales taxes are close to the ideal that they 
treat everyone alike. The perceived fairness of this property may explain the rising trend of 
these taxes in the evolution of tax systems (for a related argument regarding the role of 
bounded rationality in shaping the tax system, see, McCaffery 2000). On the other hand, 
general consumption taxes tend to be regressive. Because the income distribution is skewed to 
the right it is often said that the tax increases inequality at the cost of a majority.
29
 We have 
seen in our study that procedural fairness norms may eventually give place to distributional 
fairness considerations in such a case. 
 
 
                                                 
29
  This is certainly true in the short run if marginal propensities to consume fall with income. In this case, the 
“rich” bear a lower average tax burden than the poor. In the long run, the case is less clear since income must 
be consumed at some point (or passed on to the next generation through bequests). 
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Appendix I: Number of votes and number of paired markets accepting the discriminatory 
tax per treatment and phase 
 LOW HIGH 
Phase Market 1 
# votes out of 
48 for 
discriminatory 
tax 
Market 2 
# votes out of 
48 for 
discriminatory 
tax 
Aggregate 
# acceptance 
out of 12  
Market 1 
# votes out of 
48 for 
discriminatory 
tax 
Market 2 
# votes out of 
48 for 
discriminatory 
tax 
Aggregate 
# acceptance 
out of 12  
1 18 10 0 25 5 2 
2 29 10 0 30 7 0 
3 28 11 1 37 7 5 
4 32 16 2 39 4 3 
5 35 11 1 44 5 3 
6 35 12 2 46 4 3 
7 36 10 4 45 5 4 
8 41 7 2 46 1 0 
9 40 7 2 47 3 2 
10 39 6 1 46 2 2 
Sum and 
% 
333/480 = 
69% 
100/480 = 
21% 
15/120 = 
13% 
405/480 = 
84% 
43/480 =  
9% 
24/120 = 
20% 
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Appendix II: Instructions for the auction (Market 1, translated from German) 
General Instructions for Participants 
You are now participating in an economics experiment which funded by the Austrian Science Fund. 
The purpose of the experiment is to analyze decision making in markets. You are paid Euro 4 for 
showing up on time. If you carefully read the instructions and follow the rules you can earn more. The 
€4 and all additional amounts of money earned during the experiment will be paid to you in cash 
immediately after the experiment. In the experiment you earn points. Points will be converted to Euros 
according to the following exchange rate: Points 100 = €0.3. During the experiment we ask you not to 
speak to other participants. If you have a question, please ask us. We will gladly answer your 
questions in private. It is very important that you follow this rule. Otherwise the results of the 
experiment have no value from a scientific perspective.  
You are now participating in a market experiment. In the market, you can buy units of a hypothetical 
commodity. You earn money by trading. How much you earn depends on your and the decisions of 
others. The experiment consists of two practice periods followed by a number of trading periods. In 
the practice periods you do not yet earn money; you should take these periods seriously, though, since 
you will gain valuable experience for the paid trading periods. 
Detailed Instructions for Buyers 
In this experiment each participant is a buyer. You can buy units from automated sellers. The sellers 
will sell to you according to the rules described below. In your market there are 4 buyers who can buy 
units from sellers in each of the trading periods.  
How the market works:  
As a buyer you state a price at which you would buy a unit. We call this your “bid”. You can buy three 
units at most. You can submit a bid for each of these three units.  
The sellers bear a cost for each unit they sell. The sellers sell their units to buyers whose bids are 
above the cost for a unit. Bids that are below the sellers’ cost for a unit are rejected.  
Example: Assume we collect four bids in a market period. The highest bid is 130, the 2nd highest bid 
is 100, the 3rd highest bid is 70, and the 4th highest bid is 20.  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Bids 130 100 70* 20 
Assume that the sellers’ cost for a unit is 25. In this case, the first 3 bids are higher than the cost for a 
unit of the sellers. Therefore, the 3 units sell to the buyers who have made these bids. The 4th bid at 20 
is rejected. The buyer who submitted this bid does not buy the unit. Please note: Buyers do not know 
the bids of others, nor do they know the sellers’ cost for a unit.  
How your earnings are computed: Every unit you buy obtains a value for you. Your will learn your 
value in the experiment. If you buy a unit you have to pay a price. Each buyer pays the same price per 
unit. This market price is equal to the last accepted bid in the order explained above. In our example, 3 
units have been bought. The bid of the last accepted unit is 70 (marked with an asterisk *). The 
uniform market price is therefore 70. Please note that the first two units of the order are also bought at 
a price of 70.  
Your earnings per unit bought are calculated as follows: Earning = value minus price. Note that if you 
buy a unit you will pay less than your bid unless your bid is exactly equal to the market price. In our 
example, suppose that you submitted the bid of 100 for a unit which has a value of 130. This bid is 
above the market price of 70. Since you buy this unit at a market price of 70 your earnings will be 
130-70=60.  
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If you do not buy a unit, its value expires. On the other hand, you also do not pay a price. Your 
earnings are therefore zero.  
 
Subjects’ original instructions contained figures showing how the computer screen would 
look like in the experiment. 
 
How the trading is presented on the computer screen? In each trading period a Decision Screen 
appears (Figure 1). At the end of each period an Outcome Screen appears (Figure 2). After 5 trading 
periods a History of Results appears (Figure 3).  
In the top area of the Decision Screen on the left you see the number of the current trading period 
(here: 2) and the total amount of trading periods (here: 5). Each trading period ends after a time limit. 
The remaining time within a period is shown in the top area on the right (here: 19 Seconds).  
In the first row you see your value for buying your first unit. In this example the buyer has a value of 
130. The input field below your value serves to enter your bid. To enter a bid, click on the field 
labeled ’Your Bid’ and type in a number. To submit that bid, click on the ’Submit’ button.  In the 
second and third row everything is repeated for your 2nd and 3rd unit. 
Rules for bidding: An important rule for trading is to “trade at no loss”. Therefore, you may not 
submit a bid above your value for a unit. In the example shown in Figure 1, this buyer’s bid must not 
be above 130. If you violate this rule, a message box appears. The message disappears if you press the 
’OK’ button.  
The Outcome Screen (Figure 2) appears at the end of a trading period. Here you see your value, your 
bid, and the price for each of your units. In the center area you see the total number of units traded in 
the market (Market Quantity) and the uniform price per unit. In this example, there were 4 units traded 
at a price of 70. The next line shows the number of units bought by you (here 1). This means that this 
buyer has bought one of three units. The last row of the table shows your earnings for the current 
period. In this example, the earnings from buying the unit are 60 (=value of 130 minus price of 70).  
A History of Results (Figure 3) appears after 5 trading periods. Here, the results from each period are 
summarized. Next to the market quantity and the price, you see again the number of units bought by 
you and your earnings per period (the example of the screen contains entries only for one period; in 
the experiment the screen will contain the entries for all five periods). The row labeled “Your total 
earnings” show your earnings summed over the last 5 periods. 
 
In the lower area of the screen you find information regarding your market and “another market”, as 
well as the two markers together.  As in your market, there are 4 buyers in the other market who buy 
units from their sellers in their market. The identities of the buyers in the other market remain the 
same during the entire course of the experiment. The column labeled “tax” informs you about the tax 
the sellers must pay in your and the other market (in the example of the screen, the tax is 0 in both 
markets). The column labeled “tax per buyer” informs you of the total tax payments divided by the 
number of buyers in each market. Finally, the column labeled “earnings per buyer” informs you of 
the average income of a buyer in your market, the average income of a buyer in the other market, and 
the income per buyer averaged over both markets and over the last 5 periods. 
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Appendix III: Voting proposal (Market 1, translated from German) 
You now vote between two alternatives to raise a given amount of tax. In your market there are 4 
buyers, including yourself. There are also 4 buyers in the other market. All 8 voters cast a vote. The 
vote is anonymous; this means that no other participant is informed about how you vote.  
 
The two alternatives are: 
Alternative 1: 
Sellers in the other market pay a tax of 80 points 
for every unit they sell. 
 
Alternative 2: 
Sellers in your and the other market pay a tax of 
40 points for every unit they sell. 
 
 
Decision rule 
Alternative 1 is implemented for the next 5 periods if a majority of buyers (this is 5 or more) votes for 
it. Otherwise, alternative 2 gets implemented for the next 5 periods. 
 
Please note 
Under alternative 1, because of the tax, the sellers’ cost for a unit in the other market increases by 80 
points. Therefore, in the other market bids will be accepted only if they exceed the sellers’ cost 
augmented by 80 points. 
Under alternative 2, because of the tax, the sellers’ cost for a unit in your and the other market 
increases by 40 points. Therefore, in your and the other market bids will be accepted only if they 
exceed the sellers’ cost augmented by 40 points. 
 
 
